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If, as Steiner suggests, ‘more than homo sapiens, we are homo quaerens, the animal that asks and asks’, one would expect academics to exhibit this human characteristic to its highest degree.​[1]​  The Socratic injunction to live an examined life, continually to ask questions of ourselves, applies with particular force to the lives of academics.​[2]​  Whatever else legal academics do, one matter that should concern them is the nature of their lives.  Moreover, because of their vocation, one would expect their consideration of these things to be serious and sustained rather than casual and brief.​[3]​    

Reading law journals published at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century suggests that legal academics in the early years of British university law schools conscientiously applied themselves to their duty of self-reflection.  Thus, for example, the contents of the first 10 years of the Law Quarterly Review, begun in 1885, includes notes, book reviews and articles on university legal education in both this country and elsewhere.  Some of these pieces are very brief.​[4]​  However other contributions are much more detailed.  Pollock’s article, ‘Oxford Legal Studies’, for example, is 11 pages long.​[5]​  Similar things could be said about contributions on university legal education in the first few years of the Cambridge Law Journal. In the foreword to the first issue in 1921 Halezltine wrote of ‘a process of reform in legal education which has not yet reached its full fruition’ whilst later in the same volume Holland contributed a note on the revision of the law tripos at Cambridge.​[6]​  Although contributions on university legal education in the Cambridge Law Journal were less frequent than in the case of the Law Quarterly Review nevertheless they did appear.​[7]​  Similarly the first article in the opening issue of the Juridical Review in 1889 was entitled ‘The Faculty of Law’ and later articles on university legal education followed.​[8]​  The Journal of the Society of the Public Teachers of Law, first published in 1924, contained multiple pieces on legal education in every volume of its first 10 years.​[9]​  Nor were contributions to the literature on university legal education limited to journals at this time.  Thus, for example, Dicey’s inaugural lecture ‘Can English Law be Taught at the Universities?’ was published in 1883.​[10]​   It would be an exaggeration to say that writing about university legal education flourished at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, but it was certainly an important matter for debate. The study of the nature and practice of university legal education has thus been part of the history of legal studies in the United Kingdom from its very beginnings.​[11]​

Notwithstanding the above, the place of research into university legal education in United Kingdom law schools has been and continues to be seen, even for sympathetic observers, as being somewhat uncertain.​[12]​  Twining, writing in 1982, over 100 years after the first law schools had been opened in England and Wales, observed that “[v]irtually no serious research on legal education has been undertaken in this country”.​[13]​  Much more recently, the law sub-panel’s report on the last research assessment exercise, reported that ‘the sub-panel was pleased to receive submissions relating to legal education but the methodological rigour and significance exhibited by some of these outputs was uneven’.​[14]​

QUESTIONS ABOUT LEGAL EDUCATION

Many of the matters which are the subject of current debate about university legal education in the United Kingdom are first raised in the early literature. However, the depth of analysis devoted to them was frequently not great, even by the standards of the time. Consideration of Hughes’ two articles on university legal education will serve to exemplify the points that we wish to make.​[15]​  The title of Hughes’ article ‘Culture and Anarchy in Legal Education’ appears to be a reference to Matthew Arnold’s classic work on education ‘Culture and Anarchy’ first published as a book in 1869.  However, Hughes makes no explicit reference to the work in his article.  Since the article does discuss, in terms, both culture and anarchy with reference to legal education, it is possible, although not probable, that the apparent allusion was unintended.  Hughes’ article contains only three direct references.  Two references in the article are to law reports, where citations are given, whilst one reference is to Salomon’s ‘Grundlegung Zur Rechtsphilosophie’ where no publication details are given.​[16]​  The arguments and suggestions that Hughes puts forward are detailed, but he feels no need to support them by any reference to either the literature on education generally or to legal education in particular.  Hughes’ 1925 article ‘From a Modern Law School’ follows a similar pattern.  Whilst there is a passing mention of both Hegel and the book ‘The Golden Bough’, no precise references are made and the allusions are slight.​[17]​  Hughes’ approach to his two articles on legal education contrasts strongly with his approach to his other academic publications.  Hughes contributed three articles to the Law Quarterly Review.​[18]​  In each one of these articles there are copious references to cases and in one instance to statute.​[19]​  In each of the articles there are also limited references to secondary literature although no bibliographical details of the sources are given, even when in one instance a quotation is included in the article.​[20]​  

To compare Hughes’ work, or that of others writing at the same time, straightforwardly with modern academic practice would be inappropriate.  The conditions of academic life today are very different to what they were at the time that Hughes was writing. For example, when Street first began work as a lecturer immediately after the Second World War in his first year of teaching he was responsible for all the lectures in eight year-long courses as well as being Admissions Secretary and Secretary of the Faculty.​[21]​  The time that could be given to research and what was expected in that research has not stayed the same.  Nevertheless, there is a clear difference in what Hughes thought was appropriate when writing about university legal education as compared with his other publications. 

Hughes’ work on university legal education is typical of his time.  Whilst there was a significant amount of such writing most of it lacks anything by way of a scholarly patina.  Arguments are usually explored in isolation as though the writer were the first person to consider each topic chosen.​[22]​  In part this might be explained by the nature of the material.  Public lectures, inaugural lectures, valedictory lectures and Presidential addresses given to the Society of Public Teachers of Law are not the most auspicious places for detailed scholarly defence of argument.​[23]​  However, even if this is so when the lectures are delivered, it does not follow that when they are published, an appropriate level of level of detail cannot be added.​[24]​  In the main, however, people chose not to do this.  Legal academics did feel themselves under an obligation to reflect on what they were doing but they did not feel under an obligation to reflect very deeply.   Smalley-Baker’s Presidential address to the Society of Public Teachers of Law exemplifies this.  In it he said that since his lecture, given under the title ‘The Teaching of Law as One of the Social Sciences’, was about two courses that he gave it would therefore be ‘necessarily descriptive rather than didactic’.​[25]​  He did not, however, explain why speaking about one’s teaching is necessarily descriptive. There was both a general acceptance of the necessity of thinking about and even writing about what one was doing as a legal academic and also a general acceptance about the limits of what could be said.

One justification for the lack of scholarly references in the early literature on legal education might have been that relevant material to discuss did not exist.  The wealth of material that we have already noted in part refutes this suggestion.  The quality of the individual pieces on legal education would inevitably have been improved by direct debate between the various authors.​[26]​  However it would be true to say that the general literature on higher education that was available then was much smaller than is true now.  In a 2004 essay on higher education research Tight identified 17 specialist English language journals on higher education published outside of North America.​[27]​  The oldest of these, the Higher Education Quarterly was first published in 1947, with the next oldest, the European Journal of Education, starting in 1965. Yet it would not be true to say that there was no literature on higher education for those in the early years of law schools to build upon.  We have already referred to Matthew Arnold’s 1869 ‘Culture and Anarchy’ above.  Newman’s ‘The Idea of a University’ had been published in 1852.​[28]​  But the literature went beyond these classics.  The nineteenth century had seen a transformation in the lives of academics in England and Wales; an academic profession was created.​[29]​  Various publications accompanied this change.  Some were foreign translations.  Fichte’s ‘The Nature of the Scholar and its Manifestations’ and ‘The Vocation of a Scholar’, for example, were published in 1845 and 1847.  Other publications were domestic.  Pattinson’s much discussed ‘Memoirs of an Oxford Don’ was published in 1885 as were his ‘Sermons’, most of which focussed on the nature of academic life.​[30]​  This and other material meant that there was scholarship to build upon but those who were writing about university legal education elected not to do so.  

One further point needs to be made about writing about university legal education in the early years of law schools in England and Wales.  The vast majority of academics contributed no more than one piece about legal education in their lives.  No-one at this time chose to specialize in research into university legal education.  A sub-discipline of research into university legal education exists now but it did not exist then.  If, as Weber argued, ‘[a] really definitive and good accomplishment [in academic work] is today always a specialized act’ this necessarily limited the value of that that was produced.​[31]​ 


The JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY AND UNIVERSITY LEGAL EDUCATION

In some ways the place of university legal education in the first years of the Journal of Law and Society (at first the British Journal of Law and Society) mirrored that of law journals which were founded in the early years of law schools in England and Wales.  The editorial in the first issue commented on the legal profession’s ‘increasing reliance’ on higher education for training.​[32]​  In addition to this, 6 pieces in the first year of the Journal dealt in whole or part with aspects of university legal education.​[33]​  Future years were to see regular contributions on legal education including a special issue of 10 articles in 1998.​[34]​  

The importance in itself of a new journal that was willing to publish material on university legal education should not be underestimated.  When publication of the Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law was recommenced after the Second World War it followed the pre-war pattern of publishing material on legal education but the proportion of the journal devoted to such material soon got smaller.​[35]​  In 1974, the year when the Journal of Law and Society commenced publication, just two articles in the Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law were devoted to legal education.​[36]​   Similarly The Law Teacher, founded in 1967, whilst it published material on university legal education, was not the specialist journal for such material that it is today.​[37]​  In 1974 it published only 5 articles on legal education.​[38]​  Other journals continued to publish material on university legal education, but the fact that a new journal was prepared to devote a significant amount of its space to university legal education was not inconsequential for the subject. In addition, the academic landscape that existed in 1974 was radically different to that which existed in the early twentieth century, resulting in very different contributions to the Journal to those that had been seen in the early years of work on university legal education. 

One year after the Journal had begun Bridge, in an inaugural lecture published in the Law Quarterly Review, argued that too little research was being done in law schools.​[39]​  In the same year Goodhart wrote of the historical failure of academics in Oxford and Cambridge to publish as much as they might have because of their fear that they might be criticised for errors in publications.​[40]​  These two individual comments are illustrative of a widely held view about the nature of academic life in university law schools for a large part of the twentieth century.  In the Journal Twining wrote ‘[a]cademic law in England, as embodied in the full-time scholar-teacher of law, had, by and large, a secure and somnolent infancy. As it moves towards adolescence it shows signs of waking up’.​[41]​  A few years later Wilson wrote that

the words 'English legal scholarship' though high sounding have a similar function to the words 'disposable paper cup'.  Each adjective strengthens the message that one cannot expect much in terms of long term quality or utility from it.​[42]​

Still later Cotterrell commented that

[a]ll the centuries of purely doctrinal writing on law probably have produced less valuable knowledge about what law is, as a social phenomenon, and what it does than the relatively few decades of work in sophisticated modern empirical socio-legal studies - social scientific studies of the nature and consequences of legal practices and institutions.​[43]​

The Journal’s espousal of the socio-legal approach had important consequences for those interested in writing about legal education.

The doctrinal paradigm which prevailed in university law schools in England and Wales for much of the twentieth century was problematic for research into university legal education for two reasons.  First, if it was followed strictly, there was very little that could be said about such education beyond an examination of the legal relationships between academics, students and the institutions they were in.  Work of this sort was published but it itself could be no more than the application of established principles and rules to a particular subject.​[44]​  Secondly and more importantly, because a doctrinal approach was a paradigm in the strict sense of the word it determined what was seen as legitimate, or at least significant, research in law schools.  However, this point should not be overstated.  Whilst the doctrinal approach was dominant it never determined the nature of everyone’s research in law schools. Thus, for example, by the 1930s academics in the law school at the LSE ‘were not ashamed to describe themselves as social scientists’.​[45]​ Equally, some of those whose work was largely doctrinal, sometimes strayed into other fields using different methods.​[46]​  Even so, the doctrinal tradition was a restraining factor on interest in research into university legal education.  It legitimised the notions that thinking about the nature of work in the law school need not be done very frequently and need not be approached with full scholarly rigour.  The growing interest in socio-legal studies, key to the birth of the Journal, meant that both a wider range of material could be used in law schools and a wider range of questions could attract attention.​[47]​  Both these things were important for the study of university legal education. 

Articles on university legal education in the first year of the Journal exemplified changes in work in the area.  First, whilst early publications on university legal education had tended to be a series of ex cathedra statements, there was now debate between authors in the Journal.  Treves’ article was an explicit response to the earlier separate articles by Willock and Campbell.​[48]​  Twining’s article in the Journal also refers to the articles by Willock and Campbell.​[49]​  Similarly, although Twining’s article follows the pattern of some early work on university legal education in having first been an inaugural lecture, unlike that early work it is now an inaugural lecture with footnotes.  Neither of these things were entirely new to contributions on university legal education.​[50]​  Instead they were symptomatic of changes in the field, changes which publication in the Journal was to encourage.  Writing about university legal education was becoming, at least sometimes, research into university legal education.

Analysis of contributions about university legal education to the Journal, from its foundation to the present day, reveals one further change in the nature of work in the area.  In the early years of law schools in England and Wales it was rare for people to make even two contributions about university legal education; this continued to be so for much of the twentieth century.​[51]​  In contrast 13 people made multiple contributions about university legal education to the Journal of Law and Society between 1974 and 2016.  In addition to this some people who contributed one article on the subject to the Journal have made other contributions on the same subject elsewhere.​[52]​  In part because of this, university legal education has become a sub-discipline within legal studies.  Debate between individual academics both encourages the development of a common language and enhances the possibility that ideas will be reflected upon at a deeper level. ​[53]​  However, the question of the extent to which writing about university legal education has become research into university legal education is a somewhat different matter.

WRITING ABOUT UNIVERSITY LEGAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH INTO UNIVERSITY LEGAL EDUCATION

Analysing what makes something research rather than simply writing is different to making decisions about the quality of particular contributions which aspire to be research.  Discussing the former is about attempting to identify the rules of scholarship which make something research; doing the latter is about applying those rules.  A certain degree of consensus can be attained with regard to the former but the latter is often going to be subject to debate and revision.  The various iterations of the process of externally assessing the quality of the research done in individual departments in universities in the United Kingdom since the 1980s demonstrate this by involving an ever-more sophisticated collection of data that has done little, if anything, to change the necessarily crude nature of the judgements that are made.​[54]​  

Questions about which research fields and methods are appropriate to law as a discipline can intrude into judgements about the quality of research.​[55]​  With the demise of doctrinal studies as the dominant paradigm in law and the proliferation of both sub-disciplines and range of methods used in research there is no longer agreement within the legal academy about these issues.  As a consequence, legal academics in the United Kingdom, as in the USA, do not always at base ‘agree on criteria of excellence’.​[56]​  Yet it is only at the margins that this creates a problem when assessing the quality of research.  Only when particular methods or approaches are dismissed by some as being fundamentally unsound and incapable, even on their own terms, of producing results that are worthy of consideration for anyone will it make it impossible to agree at even a general level about research quality.​[57]​  

Even if it is essential to accept that judgements about the quality of research and scholarship are usually provisional and contestable, making such judgements is central to academic life.  What then are the basic rules of scholarship according to which this is done?

Smits suggests that   

[i]f a discipline is to be seen as an academic one, it must meet certain requirements.  First, all scholarly disciplines aim for the systematization of knowledge: they are not satisfied with a loose collection of data, but aim to describe, evaluate and explain information within an existing frame work.  Secondly, this knowledge must be obtained by a method that is recognized as valid by the academic community.  Thirdly, all disciplines aim for knowledge that supersedes the local: academic work aims for universal knowledge and is therefore necessarily international.​[58]​

Smits’ analysis resonates with Feldman’s contention that

[t]he ideals [of scholarship] include: (1) a commitment to employing methods of investigation and analysis best suited to satisfying that curiosity; (2) self-conscious and reflective open-mindedness, so that one does not assume the desired result and adopt a procedure designed to verify it, or even pervert one's material to support a chosen conclusion; and (3) the desire to publish the work for the illumination of students, fellow scholars or the general public and to enable others to evaluate and criticise it. If scholarship is directed to the pursuit of understanding, those ideals must represent normative standards which are functionally related and intrinsic to any scholarly enterprise.​[59]​

Finally, Stone writes that, ‘“good” scholarship must be “original” and it must advance our understanding.  Beyond that, it should be thorough, careful, even-handed, coherent, and intellectually honest’.​[60]​  Nothing in any of this is specific to law as a discipline; still less is it specific to particular approaches to legal scholarship. ​[61]​  Indeed, if a university is to be a university, it is important that the rules of scholarship are broadly that same in as many academic disciplines as possible.​[62]​  Judged by these standards how does writing about university legal education fare?

CONTEMORARY WRITING ABOUT UNIVERSITY LEGAL EDUCATION

Plainly, assessed by the standards above, early work on university legal education in English and Welsh universities would fare badly.  This continued to be the case for subsequent decades up until approximately the last quarter of the twentieth century; hence the comments by Twining and Wilson noted above.​[63]​  But what of writing since then?
  
It is easy to point to contemporary work on university legal educations that is research of the highest order.  It is also easy to point to work on university legal education that is either not research at all or is poor research.  It would be invidious and indeed, given the provisional nature of such judgements, pointless, to single out examples in either category.  Instead it is useful to look at what makes something good research into university legal education.  The rules are relatively simple.  From the analysis above it is possible to say that good research into university legal education builds explicitly and clearly on that which has gone before.  It engages with the relevant literature both within the sub-discipline in law and in the wider field of work on higher education.  It does not put forward claims that cannot be supported by the evidence that is being used.  It follows the rules for whatever methodology that is being used.  Writing on university legal education that is either not research or is bad research breaks one or more of these rules.  Failure to follow these rules could explain the Law sub-panel’s remarks on research into university legal education noted elsewhere in this article.​[64]​

To say that a piece of writing about university legal education is not research is not to say that that writing necessarily lacks utility.  One obvious example in this category are pieces that report on particular teaching practices.  Such work can fail to be research because they contain, in Smits’ terms, just a ‘loose collection of data’.  They relay information about what has been done at a particular institution but do not, at the highest level, produce knowledge.  Nonetheless, in the absence of research, they may be helpful when a person is reflecting on their own teaching.  Equally when Brayne writes that he is a ‘firm, occasionally evangelical believer in clinical legal education…’ one might reasonably doubt that his writing is careful and even-handed as Stone demands that research should be.​[65]​  Here again however, in the absence of research, this does not mean that such writing is without value for someone who, for example, is thinking about the nature of their own teaching.  However, the fact that something is useful for legal academics does not, of itself, make it research.

THE FUTURE OF WRITING ABOUT AND RESEARCH INTO UNIVERSITY LEGAL EDUCATION

The recent introduction of the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) may provide a stimulus for more research into university (legal) education. It explicitly includes as an example of teaching quality ‘… [the] impact and effectiveness of innovative approaches, new technology, or educational research’.​[66]​ It is likely that the type of research envisioned is applied, so that the impact of TEF on legal education research as a whole may be limited. However, the very existence of the TEF may have the effect of drawing attention to the importance of research into higher education in a more general sense, and thus provide greater opportunities for legal education researchers.  

Recent developments in relation to the Research Excellence Framework (REF), may also offer the potential for the work of legal education researchers to gain more recognition. In July 2016, Lord Stern’s review of the REF recommended that: ‘Better to align the REF with the TEF, we also recommend that research leading to major impacts on curricula and /or pedagogy within or across disciplines should be included…’​[67]​. This recommendation, if implemented, would open up another possibility for the increased valuing of legal education research by permitting it to form the subject of an ‘impact case study’ in a way which was not possible in the previous iteration of the REF.

Legal education research may be further stimulated by the fact that it is now compulsory, in most universities, for early-career academics to attend a course to train them to teach in higher education. ​[68]​ The quality of these courses remains variable.​[69]​ It is nevertheless the case that they can provide researchers with the theoretical knowledge of the relevant literature which can then be used to underpin publications in legal education. A good example of this is Dr Jessica Guth’s article ‘The Case for Time-Turners’, an autobiographical reflection on her first years as a law teacher, informed by the literature she had encountered on a postgraduate certificate in higher education course.​[70]​   
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